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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
March 13, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington

As you know, Chancellor Adenauer is visiting informally in the United States on his way to Japan. He will have spent two days in New York before he comes here March 14 and will also visit on the West Coast and in Hawaii before going to Japan. You have agreed to receive him at 10:30 on March 15 and to give a luncheon for him at 1:00 p.m. that same day.

When he calls on you, he will be accompanied by Foreign Minister von Brentano, Ambassador Grewe, Dr. Carstens, Assistant Secretary in the German Foreign Office, and by Dr. Bach, Special Assistant to the Chancellor. Ambassador Dowling, Under Secretary Dillon, Assistant Secretary Kohler, Mr. Hillenbrand, Director of our Office of German Affairs, and I will also be present.

The Chancellor has indicated that he would want to discuss with you topics relating to the Summit Conference. He may wish to raise the question of German assets, and other problems confronting the Western Alliance. I am enclosing a memorandum giving background information on these topics and on others which might arise in the discussions.

There is enclosed for your consideration a suggested joint statement for possible issuance after the conclusion of your talks.

I am also enclosing a suggested toast which you may wish to use at your luncheon for the Chancellor, a copy of the visit program and biographic data.

*Christian A. Herter*  
Christian A. Herter

Enclosures:

1. Background Memorandum
2. Suggested Joint Statement
3. Suggested Toast
4. Program of Visit
5. Biographic Data



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CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S VISIT  
Washington, March 14-17, 1960

Background Memorandum

The General Setting: Adenauer's Worries

Both the reputation and confidence of the Federal Republic and its leaders have been undergoing strong buffeting. A series of unfortunate developments (anti-Semitic manifestations, question of German-Spanish military cooperation, Adenauer's remarks at the Vatican) heightened by German maladroitness, has shown how much latent anti-German sentiment survives. The Chancellor is very much aware of the importance of the public image of the new Germany.

He has serious doubts about U.S. policies, possibly exceeding those of the past in intensity, scope and logical relationship to the strategic thinking Adenauer and some of his principal advisers seem to feel events and weapons developments are forcing on the U.S.

He was apparently considerably affected by rumors last fall about forthcoming U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe; he also seems to doubt our continuing estimate of him as a useful and reliable ally.

Finally, as to the problem of Germany and Berlin, the Chancellor suspects the British of being prepared to reach an accommodation with the Soviets at Germany's expense and he fears that the U.S. is being influenced by British thinking.

Suggested Approach

While the Chancellor will be reassured to some extent by the fact that he can once again have confidential and frank discussions at the highest U.S. levels, the following approach is suggested:

It might be pointed out that we understand that he has been having his worries recently. While the situation in the world is obviously a serious one, we believe that these specific concerns are unnecessary. We are fully determined to maintain our position

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- 2 -

on the two fundamental points affecting our common security: (1) we intend to keep our troops in Berlin, and (2) as Secretary Herter assured the NATO Ministerial Meeting last December, it is our policy to maintain U.S. troops in Europe as long as the Soviet threat and the NATO Collective Security System exists and as long as NATO continues to command the loyal participation of all its members.



It might then be stated that this provides a firm basis on which we can afford a certain measure of flexibility. On the all-German question we can counter Khrushchev's emphasis on his peace treaty proposal with stress on the principle of self-determination. The experts of the Four Powers have already made some progress in developing proposals intended to achieve this. As to the Berlin question proper, we feel committed by the Camp David communique to reopen negotiations with a view to achieving a solution in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interests of the maintenance of peace. The Foreign Ministers and Working Group experts should be authorized to explore the full range of possible solutions.

It might be useful to impress the Chancellor with certain of the practical difficulties inherent in rigidly maintaining the status quo in Berlin. We have recently acquainted the Germans in a general way with tripartite Berlin contingency planning to make clear the risks involved.

In short, while giving the Chancellor assurance of our absolute determination to protect Berlin, we should also indicate our unwillingness to accept at the outset that the German interpretation of how this could be achieved must be controlling.

#### The Summit Meeting

Adenauer is unhappy over elimination of the Germans from some Summit preparations due to NATO pressures, particularly Italian and Canadian. The U.S. favored more German participation. Adenauer may complain that German views are not being given enough weight in areas, like disarmament, of vital interest to the

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Federal Republic. We can express sincere regret that procedural arrangements preoccupied the Western Powers for over a month and that the only possible compromise had to be so much at German expense. We can express appreciation over German concessions which permitted substantive work to proceed, and give assurances that we will make every effort to see that the German Government is fully consulted on matters of interest to it.

If the Chancellor wishes to discuss the general Western approach to the Summit, we might state that we see no fundamental change whatever in Soviet aims or long-range intentions. The Soviet leaders continue determined to expand their system by any means which will not jeopardize the Soviet Union. For the moment, this rules out deliberate resort to all-out war, and we must try to ensure that this situation continues. But choice of other means of advancing Soviet aims will, we feel, be regulated only by tactical considerations which now require an appearance of reasonableness, with the notable exceptions of Soviet treatment of Berlin and the Federal Republic.



Our aim at the Summit should be to maintain Western unity in resisting firmly specific Soviet pressures while attempting to ascertain how far the Soviets are willing to go on specific, limited agreements of mutual benefit. We should also use this and future meetings to encourage the Soviets to continue their present self-imposed limitations on the means they will utilize to advance their long-range aims. Clearly, we do not expect any dramatic resolution of East-West differences to emerge from the Summit. We hope to disabuse Khrushchev of his expressed disbelief in fundamental and lasting Western unity and thus affect his future thinking. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that the meeting will aid in the long-range process of correcting Soviet misconceptions, a basic cause of our difficulties with the USSR.

#### Disarmament

The Germans continue officially to maintain that discussion of disarmament should take overriding priority at the Summit

They believe strongly in the interrelationship of disarmament and the over-all political solution so as to forestall the

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- 4 -

changing of the present balance of power for the worse. They also feel that adequate controls are necessary and have sought assurance that the Chancellor's proposal of concentrating control measures on a few types of offensive weapons and facilities will receive consideration.

Throughout its three stages, the proposed Five Power Western disarmament paper recognizes that disarmament cannot proceed to any extent without regard to the solution of political problems. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that one could proceed very far beyond the second stage without settlement of major political issues. The control ideas of the Chancellor are reflected in several of the proposals contained in the paper and could apply particularly to the problem of surprise attack.

#### German-Spanish Military Cooperation

Adenauer or Brentano may express regret over the Federal Republic's NATO allies' violent negative reaction to the German approach to Spain on possible logistical and training cooperation. If so, there is no reason not to state we were surprised at the apparent German failure to anticipate the political repercussions. We appreciate the military needs and hope a feasible method of meeting them can be developed within the NATO framework.



#### Anti-Semitism

Adenauer is known to be concerned at reaction throughout the world to the anti-Semitic manifestations in Germany early this year. If he raises the subject, it could be pointed out that we have taken every opportunity, through press statements and in correspondence, to put the situation in proper perspective emphasizing the positive attitude shown by the German Government. There is no doubt, however, that the incidents have regrettably damaged the reputation of the Federal Republic. The best way of counteracting continuing criticism will be through action by the Government evidencing its serious intention to prevent any recrudescence of anti-Semitism.

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- 5 -

#### German Vested Assets

The Chancellor will want to talk about the very difficult and complex matter of German property vested by the U.S. during World War II. The July 1957 White House Statement looked forward to a plan that would pay U.S. war claims and provide for limited monetary returns to former owners. We prepared such a legislative package, which was rejected by the German Government as inadequate. This Government then went ahead with a bill to pay U.S. claims. United States opposition to a substantial return program is probably greater now than it would have been in 1958. Congress will not favor any benefits to the Germans until an American claim bill is passed. Then we hope to re-examine the possibilities of making some returns on the vested properties.

#### Economic Aid to Turkey

The Chancellor may say that he keenly appreciates the political importance of giving aid to Turkey, but that this should be done only in a carefully coordinated, multilateral context to obtain Turkish economic self-discipline, which he thinks is now lacking. We can say that, in our view, Turkey's main economic needs are for long-term development credit and grant defense support. We hope that the Federal Republic will select the means best suited to contribute substantially to both.

#### Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

We should seek an appropriate occasion to impress on the Chancellor the continuing importance we attach to much larger financial contributions by the Federal Republic for underdeveloped countries. We may assure the Chancellor that we appreciate the Federal Republic's budgetary and financing problems, including the possibility of inflation, but we have these problems too. Nevertheless, we have been willing to assign a very high priority to foreign aid among our national objectives and we hope the Federal Republic will do so too.

We would hope that in addition, they would increase their subscription or make voluntary contributions to the International

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- 6 -

Development Association when it is established. Additionally, we wish the Germans would increase their contributions to the UN technical assistance programs and thus enable these programs to take advantage of the full U.S. contribution.

Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy

We wish to call the Chancellor's attention to ultracentrifuge equipment now being produced in Germany and the Netherlands that may contribute to a wider weapons capability and state we should like later to discuss possible controls over this equipment with German, Dutch and EURATOM officials. The U.S. continues to give strong support for EURATOM and is considering expanding its cooperation with the organization. It hopes a German reactor will be submitted under the joint program with EURATOM.



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